Subject: 25% of major wastewater facilities in significant non compliance

A recent EPA report [2004] by the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assistance documented extensive
non-compliance with the CWA. In 2002, 83 percent of facilities in SNC were repeat SNCs. In 2001, 25 percent of major
facilities were in SNC. Sixteen percent-29 percent remained in that status for 2 years or longer. Of those that returned
to compliance, there is a 50/50 probability that they will return to SNC again within 2 years.


http://www.congress.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/R?cp108:FLD010:@1(sr386)

INCENTIVES FOR COMPLIANCE
S. 1961, the Water Investment Act, passed by the Committee on Environment
and Public Works in the 107th Congress included a provision that treatment
works found to be in significant noncompliance with the Clean Water Act are
prohibited from receiving assistance other than those funds that would be
needed to bring a system into compliance in accordance with an enforceable
administrative or judicial order or other than those funds for planning,
design, or security. The exceptions in that bill ensured that utilities that
are seeking to return to compliance are still eligible, that planning and
design functions are still eligible, and that security improvements are
still eligible.

This provision would provide an added incentive for utilities to maintain
compliance with the CWA. It targets the worst offenders-the primary criteria
for significant non-compliance are:

exceed specific conventional pollutant limits by 40 percent or specific
toxic pollutant limits by 20 percent at a given discharge point for two or
more months during the two consecutive quarters;

violate any monthly effluent limit at a given point by any amount for any
four or more months during the two consecutive quarters.

A recent EPA report by the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assistance
documented extensive non-compliance with the CWA. In 2002, 83 percent of
facilities in SNC were repeat SNCs. In 2001, 25 percent of major facilities
were in SNC. Sixteen percent-29 percent remained in that status for 2 years
or longer. Of those that returned to compliance, there is a 50/50
probability that they will return to SNC again within 2 years.

Given the large number of facilities in SNC and the apparent frequency with
which they return to SNC, it is clear that incentives to encourage
compliance are required. However, S. 2550, the Water Infrastructure
Financing Act, includes no provisions to provide an incentive for compliance
or to ensure that Federal funds are spent in a manner that leads to
compliance. A provision similar to that included in section 103 of S. 1961,
the Water Investment Act, in the 107th Congress was included in the
substitute amendment offered by Senator Jeffords which failed by a vote of
10-9. Voting in support of the amendment were Senators Jeffords, Baucus,
Reid, Graham, Lieberman, Boxer, Wyden, Carper, and Clinton. Senators Inhofe,
Warner, Bond, Voinovich, Crapo, Chafee, Cornyn, Murkowski, Thomas, and
Allard voted against the amendment.


GRANTS
S. 2550, as amended, recognizes that there are some needs that should be met
above and beyond the funding levels authorized in the Clean Water State
Revolving Fund. In particular, wet weather, stormwater, and small community
needs are some of the most pressing water quality problems facing
municipalities today. The second degree amendment offered by Senator Crapo
to the Voinovich amendment on this topic included amendments filed by
Senators Jeffords (wet weather and stormwater), Warner (Chesapeake Bay),
Chafee (National Estuaries), Graham (alternative water source development)
and Reid (small systems).

However, the bill also dictates spending decisions to States by creating a
mandatory set-aside for water infrastructure grants, reducing the
flexibility of States, reducing the funds available for water infrastructure
projects, and duplicating the program-specific grants included in the bill.
On September 14, 2004, the Council of Infrastructure Financing Authorities
(CIFA) wrote to the committee stating, `This provision is troubling in
several respects. Initially, it seems at odds with the goal you support of
allowing States maximum flexibility in determining how best to meet their
individual water quality priorities. An arbitrary set aside runs counter to
the primary role provided to the States in managing the SRFs.' CIFA goes on
to say:

`The legislation specifies no basis for the grant set aside. The requirement
is not directed toward addressing hardship situations nor is any financing
need identified that would require a grant in lieu of a loan. Further, the
language permitting a waiver of the grant requirement if loan applications
are processed timely leaves in even greater doubt the possible rationale for
the set aside requirement.

While there is no apparent benefit deriving from the set aside, there are a
number of potential adverse impacts. A set aside to provide grants is
contrary to the underlying purpose of the revolving fund to continually
maximize available resources, derived from Federal capital grants, State
matching dollars and the loan repayment stream, to finance water
infrastructure. The cumulative effect of a 10 percent set aside, not subject
to repayment to the SRF, would be a significant diminishing in funds
revolving and thus less financing ultimately available to communities.

In the case of States that leverage SRF funds, the negative impact of the
set aside is multiplied. States have discretion to use the Federal
capitalization grants as collateral to borrow in the public bond market to
increase the pool of available funds for project lending. Assuming a
leveraging factor ranging from 2:1 to 3:1, States could experience as much
as a 30 percent reduction in project funding initially as a result of the
grant set aside requirement. Over time this reduction will increase
exponentially.'


CWA FUNDING FORMULA
The revisions to the Clean Water Act SRF distribution formula included in
the Water Infrastructure Financing Act are flawed in two important ways.
First, the formula places unfair burdens on three States-Iowa, Michigan, and
West Virginia-to the benefit of the others. To illustrate, if the Majority
formula proposal were adopted, Michigan would see its allocation over 5
years cut by more than half, or over $166 million. Iowa and West Virginia
would also see substantial cuts over the same 5-year period. All together,
these three States would see $215 million less over the life of the formula.
The majority of States would see only very modest gains in allocations over
5 years; Florida, a State with burgeoning water infrastructure funding
needs, would see barely an increase of $5 million over 5 years. More
damaging than the inequitable distribution of losses under the formula in
the Water Infrastructure Financing Act, is the formula's lack of a period of
time to transition from a States' current allocation to the proposed
allocation. The immediacy of the adoption of what is in some cases major
change in a States' allocation using the formula in the Water Infrastructure
Financing Act is likely to compromise the ability of the water authorities
in those States to carry out their mission.

In contrast, the substitute amendment offered by Senator Jeffords at the
mark-up on June 23, 2004 included a revised formula that would spread losses
more thinly across States and allow time for the losses to take effect.
Using a `transition period' over the 5-year lifespan of the formula, States
that experience losses in water infrastructure funding are protected from
significant cuts in the first year, and are allowed to absorb those cuts
over time.


PROJECT AUTHORIZATIONS
Finally, the bill includes a project authorization for the Southeast
Colorado Water Activity Enterprise at a cost of $85 million with no
explanation for its selection for earmarking in the bill in lieu of many
other similar projects. The report accompanying the reported bill includes
no explanation as to why this project was selected as the nation's highest
priority for water projects in the Safe Drinking Water Act program. In
addition, the substitute amendment offered by Senator Jeffords included
project authorizations for multiple water infrastructure projects. This
amendment failed by a vote of 10-9 with Senators Jeffords, Baucus, Reid,
Graham, Lieberman, Boxer, Wyden, Carper, and Clinton voting for the
amendment and Senators Inhofe, Warner, Bond, Voinovich, Crapo, Chafee,
Cornyn, Murkowski, Thomas, and Allard voting against the amendment. The
projects which failed to receive support in this amendment and therefore,
are not authorized in this bill, include:

Memphis Metropolitan Area Groundwater Study, Arkansas, Tennessee;

Old Nogales Highway, Colonia, Arizona;

Big Creek Watershed Restoration through Stormwater Control, Georgia;

White River Environmental Restoration through CSO Replacement, Indiana;

Bastrop Morehouse Parish Water Supply, Louisiana;

Fall River and New Bedford Environmental Infrastructure Project,
Massachusetts;

Statewide Combined Sewer Overflow Upgrades, Michigan;

Northeastern Minnesota water infrastructure, Minnesota;

DeSoto County Environmental Infrastructure, Mississippi;

Lower Platte River Drinking Water, Nebraska;

Central New Mexico Environmental Infrastructure, New Mexico;

Parshall Drinking Water Supply, North Dakota;

Southeastern Pennsylvania Water Infrastructure, Pennsylvania;

Lake Marion and Lake Moultrie drinking water and wastewater collection,
South Carolina;

Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Water System, South Dakota;

Colonias environmental infrastructure, Texas;

Park City Water infrastructure, Utah;

Chittenden County Storm Water Improvement, Chittenden County, Vermont;

Town of Waitsfield--Wastewater Treatment Facilities/Water relocation;

Town of Colchester Airport Parkway;

Wastewater Treatment Plant, South Burlington, Vermont;

The following California Affordable Quantity and Quality Water Act
(CAL-AQQWA) Feasibility Studies:

A conjunctive use project, in cooperation with the Calaveras County Water
District;

A water reclamation project, in cooperation with the city of Carson;

A water reclamation project, in cooperation with the Coastside County Water
District;

A water supply project at Pacheco Creek, Los Viboras Creek, and Dos Picachos
Creek, in cooperation with the San Benito County Water District;

A wetland restoration project, in cooperation with the city of San Diego;

A sediment management project at the Twitchell Reservoir, in cooperation
with the Santa Maria Valley Water Conservation District;

A groundwater assessment project at the North River, in cooperation with the
Tia Juana Valley County Water District;

Regional Seawater Desalination Program-San Diego County Water Authority;

Mission Springs Water District Water and Water Infrastructure-Desert Hot
Springs;

Eastern Santa Clara River Subbasin (Perchlorate) Remediation
Initiative-Castaic Lake Water Agency;

Bay Area Regional Desalination Project;

Calexico New River Public Health Protection Project;

South Montebello Water Infrastructure Improvement-Montebello;

Big Bear Lake Environmental Restoration project, San Bernardino Mountains;

Recycled Water Transmission Pipelines/pipeline construction, Eastern
Municipal Water district;

Raymond Basin Groundwater Restoration Project-Raymond Basin Management
Board;

Groundwater Recovery Enhancement and Treatment (GREAT) Program, city of
Oxnard;

Beach Septic System Improvements, Los Angeles County;

San Diego Region Three Reservoir Intertie Project, San Diego County;

Port of Stockton, Port of Stockton (Rough and Ready Island);

Amador Regional Wastewater Collection and Treatment project, Amador Water
Agency;

Canal Point Wastewater System, city of Pahokee, Florida;

City of Marathon Wastewater Improvement, city of Marathon, Florida;

Cypress Creek Restoration, Florida;

Key West Stormwater Improvements, Florida;

Lake Region Water Treatment Plan, Florida;

Lower West Coast Regional Irrigation Distribution System, Florida;

Miami Dade NW Wellfield-UV Disinfection of Raw Water, Florida;

Tri-County Biosolids Pelletization Facility, Florida;

East-Central Florida Integrated Water Resources Project, Florida;

Arkansas Valley Conduit, Colorado;

Southeast Colorado publicly owned water related environmental
infrastructure, Colorado;

Anacostia River Ecosystem Restoration and Combined Sewer Overflow,
Washington, D.C.;

Baltimore Metropolitan/Gwynns Falls project, Maryland;

St. Louis Environmental Infrastructure, Missouri;

Lake Tahoe Restoration, Nevada;

Henderson Watershed Assistance, Nevada;

Ohio Environmental Infrastructure Program, Ohio;

Rural Washington wastewater treatment and water supply, Washington;

Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewer District, Wisconsin; and

Wind River Irrigation Project, Wyoming